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Abstract: 
When someone masters a skill, their performance looks to us like second nature: it looks as if 
their actions are smoothly performed without explicit, knowledge-driven, online monitoring of 
their performance. Contemporary computational models in motor control theory, however, are 
instructionist: that is, they cast skillful performance as a knowledge-driven process. Optimal 
motor control theory (OMCT), as representative par excellence of such approaches, casts 
skillful performance as an instruction, instantiated in the brain, that needs to be executed – a 
motor command. This paper aims to show the limitations of such instructionist approaches to 
skillful performance. We specifically address the question of whether the assumption of 
control-theoretic models is warranted. The first section of this paper examines the instructionist 
assumption, according to which skillful performance consists of the execution of theoretical 
instructions harnessed in motor representations. The second and third sections characterize the 
implementation of motor representations as motor commands, with a special focus on 
formulations from OMCT. The final sections of this paper examine predictive coding and 
active inference – behavioral modeling frameworks that descend, but are distinct, from OMCT 
– and argue that the instructionist, control-theoretic assumptions are ill-motivated in light of 
new developments in active inference.  
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Introduction 
 
Expert performance dazzles us. The performance of a dance, of a musical piece, or of 
martial arts brings before us a display of human skills that, from a cognitive perspective, can 
only result from extensive practice. As opposed to bare movements, such as breathing and 
blinking, skillful performances are intelligent bodily activities, which harness knowledge about 
how to perform certain movements expertly.  
This knowledge, however, is not always ready-to-hand in an explicit fashion, if at all; 
and indeed, explicit conscious monitoring of one’s performance while it is still ongoing often 
leads to ‘choking’. Choking under pressure occurs when failing to complete a task that has 
already been mastered. Although deliberative strategies sometimes lead to better performance, 
in real-world and do-or-die scenarios, thinking about the process or the outcome can lead to 
worse performance results1 (Cappuccio and Ilundáin-Agurruza 2020; Cappuccio et al., 2019). 
Thus, we claim, what is involved in skillful action is not explicit knowledge.  
Skillful performance – as a fine-grained bodily response to salient features of an ever-
changing situation – can be described in terms of norms, knowledge, and expertise. This 
motivates a tendency to think of skillful action exclusively in terms of normative knowledge. 
However, it does not follow that bodily performance is itself the result of acting according to 
an explicit norm. Intelligent behavior, beyond deliberating and thinking, also involves 
intending, perceiving, understanding others, and so on. The remarkable, intelligent behavioral 
adaptation in the bodily performance of a skill suggests an understanding of knowledge beyond 
mere cognitive theorizing.  
This brings the case of skillful performance to highlight for us a seemingly paradoxical 
relation to knowledge: action both requires and is inhibited by it. Skillful performance involves 
both an exquisite sensitivity to cultural norms and situational context. Thus, the impulse to 
think that knowledge somehow becomes internalized through practice without leaving the 
intellectual domain. However, as we observe in the phenomenon of choking, the explicit use 
of knowledge also seems to hamper expert performance. How then to make sense of the relation 
between knowledge and skillful performance? Surely knowledge is involved in skillful 
performance. But is it entirely in the form of a theory that ought to be executed as a top-down 
instruction? 
Philosophers of cognition and cognitive scientists tend to model (skillful) action as 
being essentially of a theoretical nature, in the sense that it is mediated by knowledge. Skilful 
acting is, in this view, a matter of the brain ‘knowing’ (in a very strong sense) what actions 
need to be executed. That is, a cognitive top-down instruction, in the form of a belief, instructs 
the lower level motor system to behave in a certain way, giving rise to a skillful performance. 
Following Wheeler and Clark (1999), we will refer to this position as instructionism. 
We cast instructionism in terms of explicit instructions, that is, forms of knowledge that directly 
guide performance. Applied to skillful performance, the instructionist assumption prescribes 
that instructions are harnessed in separable structures, such as beliefs, that are internal to the 
performing agent (Jeannerod, 1997, 2006; Jankovic, 2019; Stanley & Williamson, 2017; 
Pacherie, 2017; Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2019; Pavese, 2019; Piñeros Glasscock, 2019). In 
more detail, the instructionist assumption says that skillful performance is enabled by motor 
representations, which harness knowledge about how a specific skillful performance should 
be executed in the form of instructions for movement. Instructionism, then, is the view that 
skillful performance depends on the capacity of an agent to represent to itself explicitly the 
 
1 Dimensions of self-consciousness, such as sensorimotor, affective, narrative consciousness, 
have been identified as a general factor of choking under pressure. See Cappuccio et. al 
(2019); see also Gray (2020). 
procedure to be accomplished. In a nutshell, the instructionist assumption is representational 
in character – skillful action is driven by motor representation (Levy, 2017; Schack and Frank, 
2020).  
Indeed, the construct of motor representation has been cashed out in different, 
sometimes overlapping ways. In the philosophy and cognitive science literatures, we find 
flavors of this construct variously formulated either as propositional (Stanley & Williamson 
2017), or as “practical representations” (Pavese, 2019), “action-based ways of thinking” 
(Peacocke, 1986), “ability-entailing concepts” (Stanley, 2011), “executable concepts” 
(Pacherie, 2011), “genic representation” (Wheeler & Clark, 1999), “action-oriented 
representations” (Clark, 1997; 2015b), and so on. What diverse accounts – as far apart as the 
propositional (Stanley & Williamson 2017) or the practical (Pavese, 2019) – of motor 
representation have in common is that they are knowledge-driven. That is to say, they make of 
action as essentially a theoretical activity.  Assuming motor knowledge is harnessed in internal 
structures that theorize explicit instructions for movement, and they will be our focus here.  
 To serve naturalistic purposes, in computational science, action is often studied under 
the rubric of optimal control theory (OCT) (Stengel, 1994; Anderson & Moore, 1990). OCT is 
a field in mathematical optimization that deals with finding a control for a dynamical system. 
Optimal motor control theory (OMCT) is a label for the modeling tools used to study motor 
behaviour and its neural processing. We target specifically OMCT to show that it rests on the 
instructionist assumption that the brain literally contains and leverages explicit instructions for 
movement. These models instantiate modularity (Fodor, 1983)2 and the separation principle 
(Baltieri and Buckley, 2018), since they take motor control to be realized by concerted 
processes performed by separable, modular subsystems (we will return to this below, in section 
6.1.) According to (linearly separable) OCT, skillful performance – indeed, all motor control 
– is realized computationally by three separate modules: (1) the inverse model, (2) forward 
model, and (3) state estimator (Friston, 2011). OCT is instructionist in that it posits that skillful 
performance is realized through the construction and execution of an explicit motor command, 
which harnesses knowledge about (instructions for) skillful, knowledge-driven motor task 
execution. Thus, on this model of motor control, the so-called forward model and optimal 
controller work together to select an optimal action, based on a value function specified in 
terms of desired states; where the motor command is specified in terms of instructions for 
movement formulated in an intrinsic frame of reference (i.e., formulated in terms of the states 
of motor effectors, such as stretching and compressing of muscle fibbers).  
The aim of this paper is to discuss critically the limitations of instructionist control-
theoretic models of skillful performance. More specifically, we target the plausibility of 
separable, modular forward and inverse models and estimators responsible for the selection of 
actions based on a (value) function of future states, as postulated by OCT. The first section of 
the paper characterizes the instructionist assumption, which casts skillful performance as being 
based in the construction and execution of explicit motor representations. The following two 
sections characterize the implementation of motor representations as motor commands 
(OMCT). We attempt to show that its instructionist assumption is ill-motivated. The brain does 
not literally contain a detailed list of instructions that it uses to move the body. The final section 
of this paper leverages work in the active inference and sensorimotor frameworks – behavioral 
modeling frameworks distinct from OCT – to understand how skillful performance unfolds 
based on embodied interaction with environment. The account portrays skill as enacted without 
the need to assume it is driven by instructions couched in terms of the content of internal 
representations. The alternative interactionist account proposed here achieves this by avoiding 
 
2 See also Drayson (2018); Jeannerod (2018); Levy (2017); Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017); 
Fridland (2015, 2017).  
two sets of commitments. It does not assume that generative models used in the active inference 
framework are models that are used by organisms or systems themselves. It does not assume 
that the explanatory story offered by sensorimotor accounts need posit any causally efficacious 
mediating knowledge. 
 
2. The instructionist model of skillful performance 
 
In this section, we examine the commitments of instructionism. Instructionist models 
define motor control of the kind involved in skillful performance as the execution of a set of 
instructions for movements to be executed according to a prespecified method or procedure. A 
motor representation is defined as a structure internal to an agent that encodes, lists or 
otherwise harnesses a set of explicit instructions for movement, the execution of which leads 
to skillful performance. As we will see, such a motor representation prescribes the specific 
manner in which a task is to be accomplished. 
How should we make sense to this? What does it mean for a thing to explicitly represent 
some state of affairs? It is common in the philosophy of mind to argue that representations 
involve modes of presentation (Frege, 1892; Millikan, 1997). This construct of mode of 
presentation has two main components: a representation presents some state of affairs (1) as 
being a certain way (2) from a specific vantage point. For instance, when I visually perceive 
the presence of a red apple, I perceive it from a certain point of view (i.e., from my visual 
vantage point), precisely as being a red apple (i.e., as opposed to perceiving it as being, say, a 
fruit or as being a red object). To represent a state of affairs thus entails that we represent it in 
a perspectival way as being a certain way; which is equivalent to saying that representations, 
essentially, must have a mode of presentation (Millikan, 1991; Zalta, 2001; May, 2006; Burge, 
2010), i.e. a “Fregean presentationalism” (Sacchi, 2018). In a nutshell, if there exist motor or 
practical representations, there must also exist a motor or practical mode of presentation (Glick, 
2015).  
The modes of presentation at play in perception, thought, and action involve a set of 
(perceptual, conceptual, and motor or practical) abilities that constitute a motor or practical 
perspective (Pavese 2019; Burge 2009, 2010; Prosser 2019). Pavese’s (2019) discussion of 
representations situates what she calls practical representations (which we equate to motor 
representations as defined above) with respect to other kinds – perceptual and conceptual 
representations. The different varieties of representation differ in the manner in which they 
enable agents to represent states of affairs. Consider, e.g., the nature of perspectives that are 
involved in the perceptual representation of a situation. On this account, perceptual abilities 
(e.g., being able to discriminate between a middle C and a D sharp) constitute a perspective 
from which one can perceive states of affairs in the world; in this case, a musical state of affairs 
about the key of a song. To be endowed with such perceptual abilities enables an agent to track 
states of affairs in the world from a given perceptual perspective opened by these abilities 
(Dretske, 1988; Millikan, 1984; Fodor, 1983). Conceptual representations, similarly, are 
related to the conceptual abilities with which agents represent states of affairs to themselves 
conceptually (Laurence & Margolis, 1999; Machery, 2009; Peacocke, 1992; Prinz, 2004). To 
represent some state of affairs conceptually thus entails the existence of a conceptual 
perspective, itself rooted in the conceptual abilities of the agent.  
Importantly, this account allows us to fix the content of a representation, namely, the 
state of affairs that the representation is about, i.e. that which is disclosed by the relevant set 
of (perceptual and conceptual) abilities with which an agent is endowed – and thereby 
constituting the perspective from which it can represent that content. In the perceptual and 
conceptual cases, what is represented is the state of affairs that can be represented as being a 
certain way thanks to the perspective that is opened by the perceptual and conceptual abilities 
with which an agent is endowed; i.e., the state of affairs that is perceived or that is entertained 
in thought or predicated, respectively.  
Pavese (2019) extends this line of reasoning to practical representation. Similarly, to 
perceptual and conceptual varieties, practical representations also represent by virtue of a set 
of motor or practical abilities that constitute a perspective from which state of affairs in the 
world is represented practically, in a format amenable to motor control. Practical abilities are 
defined as abilities to execute an action in a prespecified and typified manner. The content of 
a practical representation is a method: a specific sequence of physical movements to be carried 
out by the agent (Wolpert 1997; Pavese 2019, 2015). To be more precise, a method decomposes 
a particular task to be executed into component actions, perhaps nested the ones within the 
others, that when orchestrated bring about the desired outcome (Pavese, 2019, 2015; 
Mylopoulos & Pacherie 2017). Thus, to explicitly represent the world from the perspective 
provided by practical abilities means to represent a task as having to be accomplished 
practically in a prespecified manner, i.e., according to the method or procedure by which the 
content of the representation – the task – is presented. The distinctive feature of practical 
representation is their ‘direction of fit’: they function to make the state of affairs in the world 
fit with the prescriptions harnessed in the practical representation (Pavese, 2019). Whereas 
perceptual and conceptual abilities have a world-to-mind direction of fit, practical 
representations have a mind-to-world fit, which is what gives such representations their 
practical aspect.  
Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017) provide a definition of motor representations that 
dovetails nicely with Pavese’s (2019) account of practical representations and computational 
neuroscience research in motor control (Jeannerod, 1997, 2006). In sum, they argue: (1) that 
motor representations represent objects and situations in terms of their properties relevant for 
action, in a proprietary format specified in terms of an intrinsic frame of reference – defined, 
e.g., by the state of motor effectors, muscle fibber extension and contraction, etc.; (2) that these 
motor representations are informed by or contain implicitly some knowledge about the body’s 
biomechanical and kinematic constraints; (3) and that motor representations – at least usually 
– serve the execution of transitive movements, specified in terms of an extrinsic frame of 
reference (i.e., a representation of states of affairs that is ‘objective ’in three-dimensional space 
rather than body-dependent).  
The broad strokes of this definition seem common to most specific accounts of motor 
representation. For instance, on Pavese’s (2019) account, motor commands (which, as we will 
see below, implement motor or practical representations in OCT) represent the procedure or 
method according to which a task is to be accomplished, and are informed by a sensorimotor 
mapping from the actions being generated to their sensory consequences, satisfying condition 
(2). Moreover, they represent the method of task execution in a format that can both be used 
by the motor system to generate a motor action – i.e., in an intrinsic frame of reference, 
satisfying condition (1) – and also in a format that is sensitive to online, real time sensory 
feedback – i.e., in a manner that renders it responsive to outcomes specified in an extrinsic 
frame of reference, satisfying condition (3) of the definition just discussed.   
Pacherie (2018) notes that motor representations meet criteria for representationality as 
set out by Bermudez (1998): they have correctness or satisfaction conditions; they have a 
structure that exhibits and leverages some form of compositionality (i.e., evinces identifiable 
constituent or elementary units); and they also have a “grammar” that regulates the assembly 
of the constituent units into a coherent pattern. In cognitive science, this has led to the 
investigation of principles common to all skills, premised on the idea that what is thus common 
must be some set of representational processes. This view is labelled intellectualism (Stanley 
& Williamson 2017) and can be seen as the broader rubric under which falls our target in this 
article, namely, instructionism. At the root of such unifying models of skill is the instructionist 
assumption, which would allow for the construction of a general theory of skill, with epistemic 
attributes such as generativity, abstract rules or norms, and patterns of learning (Christensen,  
2019; Christensen & Sutton, 2018).   
Finally, we distinguish two kinds of instructionism (Wheeler & Clark, 1999; Wheeler, 
2005), one strong and one weak. Strong instructionism is the claim that neural representations 
(in this case, motor representations) completely specify, on their own, the specific movements 
to be executed by an agent. We will see that this assumption is prevalent in many versions of 
motor control theory (e.g., Jeannerod, 1997, 2006). The weak version of instructionism is the 
more modest claim that, among the many dynamically coupled systems that generate skillful 
performance (e.g., an able body, a normal ecological backdrop of cultural practices and 
standards, and so on) one kind stands out: structures internal to an agent that are responsible 
for encoding information that can be interpreted as explicit instructions for action, given a 
background of ecologically normal processes that enable them to play this role (Clark, 1997; 
Engel et al., 2013).  
On this more modest account, motor representations would play in the generation of 
behavior a role analogous to that of genes in the generation of phenotypic traits (Wheeler & 
Clark 1999). Genes however do not code for proteins (e.g., epigenetic transcription factors, the 
overall healthy and normal functioning of the cell, that cell’s being embedded in an organism, 
etc.) (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991; Godfrey-Smith 2007; Woodward; 2010; Griffiths and 
Stotz 2013; Hipólito and Martins, 2017). Analogously, the weak instructionist framework for 
motor representation says that skillful performance is the result of an orchestrated process 
spanning components in the brain, body, and world, but that of these components, some special 
structures in the brain play the specific, explanatorily irreducible role of encoding explicit 
instructions for motor performance. Note, en passant, the conformity of this definition of 
representation with the definition of motor representation by Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017) 
that was discussed above. In what follows, we will argue that neither kind of instructionism is 
warranted. 
 
 
 
3. From motor representations to motor commands 
 
An appropriate scientific representational theory of motor action must elucidate both the kind 
of content in which motor representations traffic and, crucially, how such content is supposed 
to causally guide the generation of skillful performance – lest the story have no explanatory 
bite. Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017) note that a scientifically respectable theory of motor 
action “cannot provide a full account of purposive action without appealing to motor 
representations and without explaining how intentions interface with motor representations.” 
(2017, p. 334). Computational models of OMCT must explain the manner in which motor 
representations are able to play the role of interface between the conative states of an agent 
(that is, desires and intentions to perform some task) and the motor performance.  
 Pavese (2019) argues that the construct of a motor command, which is widely used in 
the study of motor control, implements the construct of practical (or motor) representations in 
computational models of motor control. On this model, motor tasks are realized through a 
process involving “a series of sensorimotor transformations that map the intentions of the agent 
together with visual and other sensory information about the location of the targeted objects 
[…] and the location of the limbs into a series of motor commands” (Pavese, 2019, p. 791). On 
this view, a motor command is a practical or motor representation that enables the 
transformation from conative states or intentions of a motor agent (i.e., the agent’s intention to 
perform a task according to a prespecified method) to the actual motor performance itself (i.e., 
to the sequence of muscle movements that together comprise the skillful action).  
On Pavese’s (2019) denotational model, the content of a motor command is the task to 
be performed itself; a view which finds echoes in related theories of motor representation (e.g., 
Wolpert 1997). More precisely, the content of a motor command is the task outcome. hat the 
task is meant to accomplish; e.g., moving one’s body to some location in space. The motor 
command thus comprises the specification of the outcome of a task in an external frame of 
reference (i.e., in terms of movement in three-dimensional space). A motor command is thus 
the output of a (conative) system responsible for motor planning. 
Thus far, we have discussed what the contents of motor or practical representations are: 
they represent a specific method or procedure, which is defined as the explicit specification of 
movements in three-dimensional space (i.e., limb movements prespecified by a method or 
procedure, and harnessed as instructions for movement in an intrinsic frame of reference) that 
lead to some desired task outcome. We also examined how such practical representations get 
their content through their coupling to those practical abilities that open up a practical or motor 
perspective. The mode of presentation of a motor command is the prespecified method 
according to which the task is to be carried out. Thus, motor commands are also the inputs of 
the system that controls motor actions (Fridland, forthcoming). They stand as an intermediary 
between the cognitive system of the motor agent (intention and desire) and the motor system 
responsible for carrying out the actual motor performance that ends up being executed.  
Crucial to note is that, in order to play the intermediary role of informing the motor 
plant about what movements it must execute, motor commands must be generated via the 
inversion of a process mapping consequences in an extrinsic frame of reference, in which the 
desired movement is specified in terms of a task outcome in external coordinates (e.g., moving 
my finger to a point in three-dimensional space), from an intrinsic frame of reference, specified 
in terms of muscle movements. This entails an inverse inference problem, which requires 
working back from the desired sensory consequences (e.g., desired visual and proprioceptive 
sensory feedback) to a specification of their motor cause in an intrinsic frame of reference (i.e., 
a set of muscle activations that can generate such desired consequences). In other words, given 
some goal state that is specified in terms of extrinsic coordinates (and given conative states like 
desires and intentions), the problem to solve is the generation of a sequence of muscle 
movements, explicitly specified intrinsically in terms of stretching and compressing of muscle 
fibers. This has been called the “interface challenge” (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014). In other 
words, how are motor representations implemented such that they can realize or cohere with 
the intentions of an agent while also instructing motor performance? 
 
 
4. Motor commands and their representational role in optimal motor control theory 
 
In this section, we examine how motor representations are implemented as motor 
commands in computational models of motor control under Optimal Control Theory (OCT). 
Optimal Motor Control Theory (OMCT) is a label we use to refer to the modelling tools of 
motor behaviour and its neural processing. We will see that the instructionist assumption that 
motor behaviour is underwritten by the construction and execution of explicit motor 
representations that are implemented in the brain as motor commands is, as it turns out, a 
pervasive one in studies of motor behaviour.  
This inverse inference discussed in the previous section – to wit, the problem of 
inferring how to specify muscle movements in an intrinsic frame of reference that bring about 
a goal state specified in an extrinsic frame of reference – is a nontrivial one, which has been 
addressed and finessed by OMCT. A general schema as how motor control is implemented in  
OMCT is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A computational model of optimal control. This figure presents a schematic of the computational 
architecture that underwrites optimal control theory. Note the separate optimal control or inverse model, state 
estimator, and forward model and the use of a cost function by the optimal control. Reproduced from Friston 
(2011). 
 
In OMCT (Wolpert, 1997; Kawato, 1999; Todorov, 2004; Scott, 2004, McNamee & 
Wolpert, 2019), there are four main components at play in the generation of motor action: the 
motor plant, the state estimator, the forward model, and the optimal control (also called the 
inverse model). The motor control scheme functions, heuristically, as follows. The core of the 
model is the optimal controller, which tackles the inverse problem that was just discussed 
(hence, its other name, the inverse model). The optimal controller maps desired trajectories, 
specified in extrinsic coordinates, to muscle movements (i.e., to changes in muscular states 
specified in terms of intrinsic coordinates). The optimal controller selects an action based on 
the minimization of a cost function: the action that is selected is the one that leads to outcomes 
associated with the lowest cost or, equivalently, that leads to the most valuable states. The 
output of the controller is a motor command, which in our reading is a kind of practical 
representation, as discussed above.  
Once an action is selected by the optimal controller – i.e., once the controller has 
constructed a motor command – the latter is sent to the motor plant for execution. The motor 
plant is the physical motor system (e.g., a limb) that executes the task to be performed; it carries 
out the movement prescribed by the motor command, which contains a specification of the 
muscle movements needed to realize the task outcome (a representation of the method, in the 
parlance of practical representation theory). Thus, the optimal control generates motor 
commands, which implements a specific method or procedure as specified in terms muscle 
movements in an intrinsic frame of reference (the motor command). It follows that the motor 
command qualifies as a motor or practical representation in the sense discussed above.    
Physical movements of the motor plant, in turn, generate sensory information. This 
information is conveyed to a state estimator, via a sensory mapping. The function of the state 
estimator is to infer in what state the system finds itself, given its sensory feedback. The state 
estimator, technically speaking, comprises a probabilistic mapping from hidden parameters and 
states (i.e., hidden causes) to sensory observations; and its inference process inverts this 
mapping, to infer the most probable hidden cause, given available sensory data.  
As the motor command is being relayed to the motor plant, a copy of the motor 
command, known as an efference copy, is sent to a forward model. Actions have sensory (e.g., 
visual and proprioceptive) consequences; and accordingly, the function of the forward model 
is to improve the execution of action by helping to finesse the inferences of the state estimator. 
Forward models do this by converting the (efference) copy of the motor command generated 
by the optimal control into a prediction of its sensory consequences, which can be discounted 
in state estimation. In effect, the state estimator uses information, pooled from the motor plant 
(via the sensory mapping) and the forward model, to form a prediction error: it compares the 
sensory outcome predicted by the forward model with the actual sensory data that is receives 
from the motor plant. It uses this error to finesse its posterior state estimates. Of note is that, in 
optimal motor control schemes, this prediction error is not typically represented in the model 
explicitly with a distinct variable or parameter; in Figure 1, it is denoted as the update term s - 
g(x) weighted by the (Kalman) gain K. Finally, posterior state estimates are used to guide the 
process of action selection that is carried out by the optimal control; which brings us to where 
we began.  
The standard approach to computational models of separable subsystems is based on 
linear quadratic gaussian (LQG) control (Stengel, 1994). LQG-based models focus especially 
on formulations of perception and action in terms of (Bayesian) inference on the hidden states 
of the environment and on (deterministic) optimal control of a motor system (i.e., the body). 
Following this architecture, perception is often implemented using Kalman filters or similar 
Bayesian methods for estimation; while action is modelled as a process of feedback control 
based on linear quadratic regulators. The applications of the LQG framework in optimal motor 
control are ubiquitous, but often only implicit, with a few major exceptions more directly 
advocating its use in cognitive (neuro)science (Todorov and Jordan, 2002; Todorov, 2004; 
McNamee and Wolpert, 2019). 
 
 
5. The instructionist assumptions of optimal control theory 
 
The formulation of sensorimotor control in terms of OMCT heavily hinges on two 
different, but highly interconnected, assumptions: (1) the central specification of descending 
motor commands, and their (efferent) copies, in the form of detailed low-level instructions for 
control of the motor plant, which is specified in terms of an intrinsic frame of reference (i.e., 
extension and contraction of muscle fibbers), and (2) a separation of forward and inverse 
models, operating on complementary aspects of action planning and execution. 
 As highlighted in the previous section, the constructs of motor commands and their 
efference copies are typically used in frameworks focusing on the computational role of various 
components (the state estimator, forward and inverse models) derived from (optimal) control 
theoretic approaches to the problem of motor control. In this light, motor commands are cast 
as the product of an optimal controller (or inverse model), which builds accurate action policies 
based on explicit internal models of the biomechanical and kinematic properties of an agent’s 
musculoskeletal system (the sensory mapping). While forward models are thought to emulate 
the mechanical properties of a body and its interactions with an environment, once a certain 
action policy is implemented, inverse models are normally portrayed as inverting these cause-
effect relationships to form plans over future actions, based on state estimators (also called 
comparator models) that combine internal simulations of agent-environment couplings and 
desired target states.  
Let us recall the main features of the construction of motor command as it figures in  
OMCT. The presence of these two models, forward and inverse, naturally introduces the idea 
of different frames of reference over which internal models must operate: an intrinsic one, 
specified in terms of musculoskeletal properties of the body (e.g., muscle fibbers), and an 
extrinsic, movement-based one, characterising the external features of motor programs (e.g., 
hand position); see Friston, (2011) for a discussion of these ideas in the literature. In particular, 
a forward model takes a system from an intrinsic to an extrinsic frame, predicting the effects 
of different movements using musculoskeletal plans specified by neural activity, and 
essentially translating motor commands into actions on the world and their consequences. On 
the other hand, an inverse model builds motor commands by inverting this causal chain. The 
inverse model first leverages a value function of states, to form a mapping from desired target 
states in an extrinsic frame of reference (i.e., in a coordinate system based on external 
consequences of movements) to a set of intrinsic coordinates in the space of muscle fiber 
activations; and then maps these activations to a set of neural activation patterns in the motor 
system that are capable of generating the appropriate and desired muscle activations. From a 
more mechanistic perspective, frameworks based on OMCT are sometimes characterized in 
terms of “force control,” stressing the idea that, in these models, motor commands specify 
actions in the form of muscle forces and joint torques (Hollerbach, 1982; Kawato, 1999; Ostry 
and Feldman, 2003).  
This architecture rests on the assumption, central to OMCT, that value (valuable states) 
is what causes action. As we have discussed, in models from OMCT, sequences of actions are 
selected according to a value function of states. This means that actions are selected by the 
optimal control that maximize the value of – or, equivalently, minimize the cost or risk 
associated with – future outcomes, defined in terms of desirable states.  
A second major assumption in computational models of optimal control for action 
(OMCT) is their (often implicit) reliance on a sequential, modular architecture of perception-
cognition-action, notably described as the “sense-model-plan-act” paradigm (Brooks, 1991) or 
the “classical sandwich” of cognition (Hurley, 2001); see Baltieri and Buckley (2018) for 
discussion. On this conception, action, perception, and cognition are depicted as separate 
processes, working relatively independently with specialized kinds of representations 
(practical, perceptual or conceptual, respectively) based on different mechanistic and 
neurophysiological (e.g., localised) implementations (cf. the idea of “vertical modularity” in 
(Hurley, 2001)). This is a classical idealisation of the sensorimotor loop, in which perception 
is portrayed as a bottom-up or feed-forward process with the primary goal of receiving 
information through the senses in order to build internal representations of the surrounding 
environment (Marr, 1982). Action is then cast as a process of deriving appropriate motor 
commands based on the outcomes of cognitive internal manipulations, such as thinking and 
planning.  
This notion of separable subsystems has its roots in the classical hypothesis of the 
modularity of the mind (Fodor, 1983) and often constitutes one of the underlying assumptions 
in various applications of OCT to the study of cognitive agents (Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert & 
Kawato, 1998); see Baltieri & Buckley (2018, 2019a) and George & Sunny (2019) for some 
reviews. On the modularist view, more ‘peripheral 'components of cognitive systems, i.e., those 
subserving action and perception (but according to some, perhaps also some of “central 
processing”, see Barrett & Kurzban, 2006 for a review) are implemented as separable modules, 
working independently to transform sensations incoming through input interfaces (perception) 
into internal models, used to plan actions executed via output layers (motor control, behavior). 
The information content of each specialized module is encapsulated (i.e., the module is 
informationally semi-independent from other parts of a system), and the kinds of computations 
it performs is specialised as well; an idea closely related to the concept of cognitive 
impenetrability typically discussed in the context of perceptual processes (Pylyshyn 1999; 
Coltheart, 1999; Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Raftopoulos, 2019). 
In summary, motor control schemes in OMCT are instructionist, as we described the 
notion in the opening sections. This can be seen from the modular architecture in these 
schemes, which is based on sensorimotor representations in the form of separable forward-
inverse models and estimators. This architecture for motor control is used to compute explicit 
motor commands, which implement the construct of motor representation: they harness explicit 
motor instructions, canvassed in a proprietary format that the motor plant can use to guide an 
instruct the execution of action (i.e., specified in an intrinsic frame of reference), so obtain 
desired states specified in extrinsic coordinates. We now critically examine this assumption.  
 
 
6. Less control, more action: From optimal control to predictive coding and active 
inference  
 
Thus far we have claimed that the instructionist assumption of OMCT has two parts: 
 
(1) The presence of separate forward and inverse models, with the latter being in 
charge of selecting motor plans according to a cost function expressing the value of 
states to be attained through action; and 
 
(2) Instructions expressed in the form of motor commands, lists of low-level motor 
outputs that are built using internal representations of the biomechanics properties 
of a motor plant, i.e., the body. 
 
In what follows, we critically examine these two assumptions. 
 
 
6.1. From forward-inverse models and cost functions to generative models  
 
The optimal control approach has been repeatedly challenged over the years, with work 
questioning its neurophysiological plausibility (Ostry & Feldman, 2003; Feldman, 2009; 
Feldman, 2015; Latash et al. 2010; Latash, 2020), the computational scheme of forward and 
inverse models with separate roles (Adams et al., 2013, Clark 2015a; Pickering & Clark, 2014), 
its reliance on cost functions, and its claims regarding optimality expressed in terms of the 
value of states (Friston 2011; Friston et al. (2012); Pezzulo et al. 2015).  
The account of separable, modular perceptual and motor subsystems, in particular, has 
recently been suggested to reflect a classical result in the control theory literature, where 
modular regulators are defined using the “separation principle” (Baltieri & Buckley, 2018, 
2019a). In control theory, this principle describes a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the independent optimisation of the two main components of a device regulating a system 
in the presence of uncertainty: a paired state estimator and forward model, and a (deterministic) 
controller. Under the assumptions of the separation principle, teleological behaviour can be 
cast as a sequential process of optimal estimation, combining state estimation and forward 
models, followed by a phase where internal world (forward and inverse) models are refined 
and used for off-line planning. This leads to an optimal control stage, where actions are 
produced by an inverse model of the dynamics of a plant (e.g., the body) using accurate 
estimates of the current state of a system. An intrinsic assumption of optimal motor control 
approaches based on the separation principle is thus that sensorimotor control is orchestrated 
mainly by two separate modules: a combined state estimator/forward model and an inverse 
model. The assumptions behind the separation principle in control are, however, rather strict 
and include, for instance, the presence of linear dynamics, the use of quadratic cost functions 
and dynamics where uncertainty is expressed using Gaussian noise. As previously suggested, 
some of these assumptions can be easily violated when applied to the study of biological 
systems (Todorov, 2005; Baltieri & Buckley, 2018). 
Perhaps the most important shortcoming of this approach comes from the fact that its 
formulation expresses motor signals as neutral, or equivalently, the lack of dual effects of motor 
actions (Bar-Shalom & Tse, 1974). In practice, this means that the canonical controls generated 
by LQG models cannot reduce (or even increase) a system’s uncertainty in the future, i.e., 
actions can only be instrumental, and have no epistemic effect on future state estimates – with 
a possible exception to this account found in the optimal feedback control extension of the 
model by Todorov & Jordan (2002) and Todorov (2005). In accordance with the differences in 
terms of epistemic actions, approaches based on the separation principle have variously been 
addressed also as adaptive (as opposed to dual) controllers (Kappen, 2011), or feedback (as 
opposed to closed-loop) methods (Bar-Shalom and Tse, 1974). 
The active inference framework3 offers an alternative account of skilled action (Friston 
et al., 2012; Friston et al. 2017). In the active inference framework, some of the assumptions 
that underwrite the separation principle are dropped in favour of a more cohesive and unifying 
perspective on forward and inverse models (Baltieri and Buckley, 2018, 2019a; see also George 
and Sunny (2019)). The active inference framework thus comprehensively challenges the 
optimal control theoretic approach to sensorimotor behaviour, highlighting some of the 
limitations associated with such schemes based on value functions (Friston, 2011; Friston et 
al., 2012), with natural implications for accounts of skillful performance. In particular, here, 
we refer to the idea that traditional OMCT accounts of behaviour can only specify performance 
using a single number, a scalar that is defined and consequently tracked by a value function. 
Value functions express criteria of optimality for motor behaviour that instantiate an index of 
“accuracy,” which reflects how a specific definition of value uniquely maps to an act or motor 
plan conforming to a goal. Indeed, the physics of flow embedded in active inference accounts 
of sensorimotor behaviour show that motion in a biologically realistic state space irreducibly 
includes two orthogonal kinds of motion: an irrotational (or curl-free) component and a 
solenoidal (or divergence-free) component. The former is what allows the flow to climb a 
gradient towards more valuable or probable states (i.e., moving from less to more valuable 
states); while the latter specifies a flow around an isoprobability contour, where all entered 
states have an equal value or probability (i.e., different configurations of states expressing the 
same value, or rather skillfulness, that may be relevant in different contexts). Heuristically, the 
irrotational component contributes to the appetitive, motivated aspect to behaviour, getting the 
agent closer to desired states or observations; whereas the solenoidal component describes 
behaviour that does not aim directly at need satisfaction. Together, these flows provide a richer 
framework for expressing skilfulness as a process whose characteristics go beyond a simple 
gradient of value/accuracy. Value functions – and indeed any motor scheme based on functions 
 
3 We will occasionally appeal to technical terms that are in common usage in this field. 
Please see the glossary in Box 1 for relevant definitions. 
that return scalars – are not up to the task of modelling the variety of (skillful) acts describing 
human behaviour because, by construction, they cannot account for the solenoidal aspect of 
flow.  
The active inference framework does away with the possibility of positing inverse 
models, previously claimed to be physiologically not realisable (Ostry & Feldman, 2003) and 
computationally intractable without extra constraints (Adams et al., 2013). The active inference 
framework replaces value functions and solutions to optimal control problems formulated as 
motor commands based on dynamic programming methods with priors (in the form of 
Bayesian ‘beliefs’). That is, the active inference framework replaces the inverse-forward model 
pair with a generative model that expands on a forward model to harness probabilistic beliefs 
about expected sensory consequences of action. Rather than using a separate inverse model to 
infer the most appropriate course of action, active inference schemes invert the generative 
model through the use of (approximate) Bayesian inference techniques in order to select action 
policies.  
The active inference framework does not operate with value functions (Friston, 2011; 
Friston et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013). Instead of selecting actions using a (value) function 
of states, active inference models directly construct a prior preference over sensory outcomes 
or observations, which is used to guide motor control in a feedback-sensitive, online fashion, 
in an extrinsic frame of reference. Technically, active inference extends popular predictive 
coding models used in neuroscience, where perception is cast in terms of prediction error 
minimisation (Rao and Ballard 1999). The active inference framework extends this account to 
model motor control, and explains action selection by appealing to the minimisation of 
divergence between predicted sensory data and actual sensory data in, e.g., visual and 
proprioceptive modalities. The core idea, then, is that rather than select an explicit motor 
command, the organism ‘infers’ what it must be doing, under the assumption that what it does 
must minimize prediction error (see Friston, 2011). Crucially, this brings perception and action 
together in the same functional profile and also explains some of the similarities between 
functions of sensory and motor cortices (Adams et al., 2013). While this move from a problem 
of control to one of inference in terms of active inference does not make the problem 
mathematically easier in and of itself (Friston, 2011), it offers a different model of skilled action 
which also respects the neurophysiological evidence.  
In this light, the active inference framework stands in stark contrast to optimal control 
accounts described earlier, where forward and inverse models are seen as distinct functional 
units with perception and action lying at the two opposite ends of a chain of sequential 
processing (cf. the classical sandwich of cognition). The active inference framework does away 
with inverse and forward models in favour one single, expanded generative model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Motor control in active inference. This figure presents the models employed in the active inference 
framework. Note that the cost function has been replaced with proprioceptive prediction-error based control and 
that the separate inverse-forward models and state estimator have been merged into an expanded forward 
(generative) model. Reproduced from Friston (2011). 
 
6.2. From motor commands to proprioceptive predictions 
 
A second important move afforded by the active inference framework is the replacement of 
motor commands in the form of accurate motor plans in intrinsic (bodily) coordinates, 
considered to be unrealistic due the required specificity of a plan and the huge number of 
degrees of freedom of the neuromuscular system, with predictions about proprioception (Ostry 
and Feldman, 2003; Adams et al., 2013). This implicitly solves some of the main issues with 
models relying on the inversion of the many-to-one mapping from a high-dimensional intrinsic 
frame of reference to a low-dimensional external, movement-based, coordinate system. In 
practice, this summarises the problem of motor redundancy (see Latash (2012)) where several 
combinations of different muscle activations can lead to the same final goal, think for instance 
of an arm reaching task and the virtually infinite number of possible arm trajectories that could 
satisfy a given final goal in the form of a target location. 
In the active inference framework, action planning is described in terms of an inversion 
process of a generative model via the inclusion of a proprioceptive modality, and an ensuing 
minimisation of proprioceptive prediction errors. While this proposal provides an alternative, 
arguably more parsimonious, version to inverse models, it only apparently solves the most 
problematic aspect of these models: the inversion of the process generating musculoskeletal 
motor plans from patterns of neural activity. The hard part still consists of ultimately explaining 
action execution via the inverse mapping from an extrinsic to an intrinsic frame of reference, 
for which predictive coding models don’t provide a natural account (Friston, 2011). To solve 
this problem, the active framework inference forgoes explicit movement specification in terms 
of a mapping from an extrinsic to an intrinsic frame of reference. It does so by dropping its 
reliance on the value function that, in the end, in OMCT, specifies motor commands in terms 
of musculoskeletal properties of a system. 
 The active inference framework proposes an account of perception-action cycles that is 
consistent with some ideas of the mechanical description of motor actions provided in threshold 
or referent control (previously also known as the “equilibrium-point hypothesis” or “virtual 
trajectories control”) (Feldman, 2015). Similarly, to this framework, active inference suggests 
that, rather than encoding muscle forces or joint torques, descending motor signals act as 
thresholds that shift the activations of stretch reflex muscles in order to create movement as a 
“chain of reflexes” (Adams et al., 2013). Unlike referent control however, active inference 
framework commits to the idea that such thresholds can be interpreted directly in terms of 
responses to proprioceptive information of the target state, as opposed to thresholds “lambda” 
typical of referent models (Feldman, 2015). 
 In the active inference framework, proprioceptors become perception-action units 
whose combined functions for perception and action are controlled by precision parameters 
(Adams et al., 2013). This has two deep ramifications for motor control. First, in active 
inference, classical motor command and efference copy constructs of OMCT become 
redundant; and second, control assumes a dual role in active inference schemes, reflective of 
the dual role of action itself in these schemes. The former point speaks to the idea that 
frameworks based on optimal control and the separation principle typically require (efference) 
copies of motor commands (forces and torques) to be passed from an inverse to a forward 
model, such that predictions generated by forward models can discount the effects of one’s 
own actions on one’s perception of the world. While in robotics and control theory, this is 
classically solved by the presence of an efference copy of motor signals sent to the estimator 
(Kawato, 1999) that is known to the engineer/roboticist; in neurobiology, on the contrary, the 
role of this copy is hotly debated (Bridgeman, 2007; Feldman, 2009; Adams et al., 2013; 
Feldman, 2016). Thus, for principled reasons, the active inference framework avoids the 
requirement for a controller to send an efference copy to the estimator and forward model. This 
is due to the fact that forward connections already denote prediction errors in their mappings 
from prior beliefs about expected limb trajectories to their (proprioceptive) sensory outcomes.  
Further, by building a framework that takes advantage of simple, lower-level motor 
functions, which are increasingly recognised as being more than simplistic, pre-programmed 
reflexes (Bizzi et al., 2000; Buhrmann and Di Paolo, 2014; Weiler et al., 2019), the active 
inference framework introduces an account of the dual effects of action at different levels. On 
a short spatio-temporal scale (action execution), one finds an implicit account expressed in 
terms of variational free energy (or prediction error) minimisation4, constrained by the dual 
role of proprioception in predictive coding models with reflex arcs (Friston et al., 2010). On 
longer time scales (such as those involved in action planning), on the other hand, a more 
explicit account of this exploration/exploitation problem emerges with the minimisation of 
expected free energy on expected future outcomes given prior preferences, and the explicit 
presence of epistemic and instrumental terms within the definition of the expected free energy 
functional (Friston et al., 2017). 
Having offered reasons to reject both conditions, (1) the presence of forward and 
inverse models, as well as (2) instructions as motor commands, we now see that active 
inference can offer a formal model to explain skilled action, from first principles, without 
supposing explicit motor instructions.  
 
 
 7. Motor control as interactive sensorimotor engagement with the world 
 
4 See Box 1. 
 
 Let us take stock of what has been said so far. We started from the observation that the 
most popular models in the field of motor control studies make an instructionist assumption. 
In instructionist models, skillful performance is explained by appealing to the construction and 
execution of motor commands. That is to say, these models posit motor or practical 
representations, which harness knowledge about how a specific skillful performance is to be 
executed in the form of explicit motor instructions that is specified in terms of an intrinsic 
(muscle-based) frame of reference. We then reviewed new frameworks in the study of motor 
control – namely, active inference and predictive coding – which undermine some of the 
instructionist assumptions. We saw that, in these frameworks, nothing like an explicit motor 
command ever needs to be computed; which undermines even the weak version of 
instructionism (Wheeler & Clark, 1999). Where does this leave us in terms of a positive 
proposal? What is skillful performance, if it does not consist of detailed lists of instructions for 
the execution of motor commands?   
The active inference framework offers a formal model of motor control as a process of 
online, real-time motor adaptation to an environment. Such adaptation can be understood in 
terms of attunement between organisms and their environments (Bruineberg et al., 2014; 
Anderson 2017; Ramstead et al., 2019; Hipólito 2019; Hipólito et al. 2020). The tight and 
reciprocal reconnection between perception and action in the active inference framework 
resonates deeply with several key ideas developed within embodied and enactive approaches 
to cognition and agency (Di Paolo et al., 2017; Newen et al. 2018; Gallagher 2020; Ramstead 
et al., 2019). In particular, the inescapable codependence between action and perception in 
active inference coheres nicely with one brand of enactive-embodied cognition, namely, 
sensorimotor approaches to the study of cognition (O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Engel, Friston, & 
Kragic, 2015; Engel et al., 2013; Di Paolo et al., 2017; Gallagher 2020).  
One might wonder how the active inference framework could complement and be used 
to support enactive-embodied approaches, as a realistic proposal about the nature of cognition. 
After all, the active inference framework is neck deep in talk of ‘inferences’, ‘predictions’, 
‘prediction errors’, ‘priors’, and even ‘beliefs’. Prima facie, such references seem to entail a 
serious commitment to an understanding of cognition as a form of world-modelling. 
Accordingly, this appears to commit proponents of the active inference framework to the 
assumption that, when cognizing, organisms or their subparts must be making use of generative 
models in order to act on the world intelligently, because having a generative model is thought 
to be what enables cognizers “to evaluate potential actions using (as the name suggests) some 
kind of inner surrogate of the external arena … [something that allows them] to ‘navigate into 
the future’” (Clark, 2016, p. 254). 
Yet even some of the most forthright defenders of the active inference framework have 
backed away from making such strongly realist claims about the causally efficacious character 
of generative models. Indeed, Friston (2013) has advanced the view that an “agent does not 
have a model of its world – it is a model” (Friston 2013, p. 213). Elsewhere, in line with a 
recognition of the purely formal character of generative models, Friston, Thornton, and Clark 
(2012) advise that, “We must here understand ‘model’ in the most inclusive sense, as 
combining interpretive dispositions, morphology, and neural architecture, and as implying a 
highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active, embodied organism and the embedded environment.” (p. 
6). 
Crucially, if we accept the generative models of the active inference frameworks in line 
with these proposals then we must embrace the idea that generative models are causal in the 
sense of an agent’s enactive attunement with the world, rather than a part of the causal 
efficacious machinery used by an agent. A simple reason to do so is that a generative model 
cannot be both identified with the system itself and, simultaneously, a model that the system 
itself uses to drive its behaviors. 
If we understand the status of generative models in the active inference framework as 
purely formal, epistemic tools, then this framework is, we argue, compatible with a 
sensorimotor approach to understanding skilled action. Sensorimotor accounts assume that 
perception (O’Regan & Noë, 2001) and perhaps higher order cognitive functions (Maye & 
Engel, 2013) emerge as a process of interactive engagement with the world, based on an 
organism’s acquired responsiveness to sensorimotor contingencies, defined as a series of 
invariant correlations describing the relations between sensory and motor modalities (Noë, 
2004). Perception is thus only appropriately defined for agents actively interacting with their 
milieu, when the world is dynamically coupled to an agent (Di Paolo et al., 2017); rather than 
on the “classical sandwich” of cognition (Hurley, 2001), which casts motor control in terms of 
sequential perception, planning, and action. On this account, perception and action are cast as 
the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. Importantly, we argue that it is possible to retain 
the key interactionist idea from the sensorimotor approaches in play without buying into any 
of the more controversial claims about the representational character of sensorimotor 
contingencies and their nature as invariant correlations for perception and action for mediating 
knowledge (see Hutto 2005, and Hutto and Myin 2013 for critiques of the latter). 
Importantly, as suggested by Di Paolo and colleagues (2017), the sensorimotor view 
reflects a spectrum of ideas, which includes simple open-loop sensorimotor correlations, 
closed-loops ones, regularities given a goal, and optimal sets of regularities according to a 
certain performance metric. These can be understood using the tools of dynamical models of 
cognition, capturing the brain-body-environment interactions in terms of dynamical systems as 
opposed to assuming the agent is involved in symbolic computation (Chiel and Beer, 1997). 
These “anti-representational” ideas hark back to the explanatory strategies of ecological 
psychology (Gibson, 1979) and need only speak the “lawful linkages between sensory and 
motor systems” advocated by Varela et al. (1991) or the “subjective physics” of perception 
(Brette, 2013). When they are situated in the context of biological systems and their 
biomechanical constraints, sensorimotor contingencies may also be seen in terms of 
“synergies,” capturing the attunement of different muscle groups to specific tasks engaged by 
an agent (Latash, 2008). Thus, instead of constructing elaborate instructions harnessed in motor 
representations, motor control deploys smooth real-time adaptation to the salient aspects of a 
situation, leveraging the biomechanics of interacting physical bodies. 
In active inference, a similar account emerges once we consider non-modular 
approaches to cognition, combining predictive approaches to perception, dynamic reflex arcs, 
and mechanisms for planning over expected future outcomes (Parr & Friston, 2018). As 
previously suggested, for instance, by Brette (2013) and Di Paolo and colleagues (2017), the 
idea of sensorimotor contingencies is well captured by simple relationships between 
proprioceptive sensations and motor actions. We further argue that the predictive role of 
proprioception advocated in active inference extends causally linear accounts of motor control 
(such as the one by Brette 2013), which tend to focus only on the contingency between new 
actions and their consequences on proprioceptive sensations (i.e., new action → new 
proprioceptive state). Active inference in fact proposes a complementary view, where 
predictions of expected proprioceptive states are not just seen as passive reactions to new motor 
signals, but as also triggering adjustable, dynamic reflex arcs to generate new actions (new 
proprioceptive state → new action → new proprioceptive state → new action → ...). The temporal 
depth of this model confers a more active, anticipatory role to proprioception, now seen in a 
causally circular model of sensorimotor control, in line with the enactive and embodied 
approach of Di Paolo and colleagues (2017); where action is informed by perceptual processes 
and perception is itself an active process of engaging with the world (Baltieri & Buckley, 2017; 
Baltieri & Buckley, 2019b). 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper critically discussed the limitations of instructionist approaches to skillful 
performance and also to assess what kind of knowledge (if any) is involved in motor control. 
The instructionist assumption is that according to which skillful performance is, at bottom, 
driven by motor representations that harness instructions about how to perform a given task. 
We examined the manner in which motor representations are operationalized as motor 
commands in OMCT. We asked whether the assumption of modular knowledge-driven motor 
control in OMCT, which is based on a modular architecture implementing separable state 
estimators, forward models, and inverse models, is warranted, and concluded that it is not. We 
argued that active inference does not need to posit the instructionist assumption. If the 
generative models proposed within the active inference framework are understood as purely 
formal tools, it is possible to develop an interactionist account of skilled performance, i.e. an 
account where, by drawing on the resources of dynamical tools, perception and action are 
deeply connected. Future research will elaborate on the theoretical and formal consequences 
of active inference as a non-instructionist framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Box 1 – Active Inference and the free energy principle 
 
Variational free energy: a statistical measure used in problems of approximate Bayesian inference 
as an effective upper bound to surprisal, a (usually incomputable) quantity that represents the 
negative log-probability of an outcome, e.g., the sensory states for an organism. Under Gaussian 
assumptions, variational free energy reduces to a weighted sum of prediction errors. 
 
Free energy principle: A statement of some of the properties that all self-organizing systems that 
have necessarily by virtue of existing. The free energy principle says that self-organizing systems 
that have a Markov blanket and a phenotype will appear to engage in behavior that minimizes a 
variational free energy functional.  
 
Active inference: Under the free energy principle, systems can be interpreted as engaging in active 
inference in order to minimize their free energy. A system can be described to engage in active 
inference in the sense of performing belief updating and acting such as to fulfil prior preferences 
about observations. Describing a self-organizing system in terms of active inference means that the 
system acts upon its external milieu to maintain itself in its preferred states (cf. homoeostasis). Active 
inference provides a mechanism to derive the dynamics of sensory and active states such that they 
minimize a variational free energy functional. This allows us to describe an agent as engaging in 
actions that will get them closer to their preferred sensory states. Belief updates, in turn, contribute 
to the optimization of internal states, which tightens the (free energy) bound on surprisal, thus 
enabling action to avoid (statistically) “surprising” sensations; and corresponds to perception. 
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